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[Crim. No. 9944. In Bank. July 7,1966.] 
In re MARGARET LOUISE McCARTNEY 
on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - 01fenses of Di1ferent 
Degrees-Oonviction of Included 01fense: Homicide-Defenses. 
-Defendant's conviction of second degree murder at her first 
trial was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her convic-
tion of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquittal of 
second degree murder. 
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-01fenses of Di1ferent Degrees-Convic-
tion of Included 01fense: Homicide - Ohargi.J1g 01fense-
Oonviction of Included 01fenses.-An indictment or informa-
tion charging murder also charges all lesser o1fenses neces-
sarily included in the crime of murder, including voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 1159); and one who 
has been charged with murder, convicted of manslaughter, and 
had his conviction reversed on appeal, may be retried for man-
slaughter on the original indictment or information. 
[3] Homicide-Limitation of Prosecution.-Where an information 
charging nlurder was filed before the three-year period had run 
against manslaughter, following the reversal of defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder in the first trial and the 
reversal of her conviction for manslaughter in the second trial, 
she could be tried under the original information for man-
slaughter though the three-year period had then run or she 
could move to have the information amended to reflect that she 
could be convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 311; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st ed 
§572). 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, 
§ 28; [2] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, § 48; [3] Homicide, 
§2. 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council . 
) 
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[6] Petitioner is not entitled to release, however, since he is 
held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to 
show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and 
White, J.,. concurred. 
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PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Order to show cause discharged and writ denied. 
Joseph W. Fairfield and Ethelyn F. Black for Petitioner. 
Evelle J. Younger, District Attorney, Harold J. Ackerman, 
Chief Deputy District Attorney, Harry Wood, Robert Lord 
and Harry B. Sondheim, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Respondent. . 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus 
on the ground that her pending trial in the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County is barred by the prohibition against 
double jeopardy and by the statute of limitations. (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 800.) 
On November 14, 1961, the District Attorney of Los Angeles 
County filed an information in the superior court charging 
that petitioner committed murder ~n or about October 23, 
1961. (Pen. Code, § 187.) She was convicted of second degree 
murder in a jury trial, but her conviction was reversed on 
appeal. (People v. McOartney, 222 Cal.App.2d 461 [35 Cal. 
Rptr. 256].) On retrial she was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192), but this conviction was also 
reversed. (People v. McOartney, nonpublished opinion, Dis~ 
trict Court of Appeal, 2 Crim. 10410, Sept. 16, 1965.) 
Petitioner's third trial was set for January 19, 1966. At 
that time she moved that the information be dismissed, 
contending that her conviction of manslaughter was an acquit-
tal of the charged murder and that the information could not 
be amended to charge manslaughter because the statute of 
limitations for manslaughter had run. The trial court denied 
her motion, but to avoid a possibly needless retrial granted a 
continuance while she sought relief on habeas corpus. 
[1] Petitioner's conviction of second degree murder at her 
:first trial was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her 
conviction of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquit-
tal of second degree murder. (Gomez v. Superior Oourt, 50 
Cal.2d 640, 643-647 [328 P.2d 976].) [2] An indictment or 
information charging murder, however, also charges all lesser 
offenses necessarily included in the crime of murder, including 
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (Pen. Code, § 1159 ; 
People v. McFarlane, 138 Cal. 481, 484 [71 P. 568, 72 P. 48, 61 
L.R.A. 245]; People v. Smith, 134 Cal. 453, 454-455 [66 P. 
669].) Accordingly, a defendant who has been charged with 
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murder, convicted of manslaughter and had his conviction 
reversed on appeal may be retried for manslaughter on the 
original indictment or information. (People v. McFarlane, 
supra, 138 Cal. 481, 484; People v. Smith, supra, 134 Cal. 453, 
454-455.) 
[3] It is 01 no significance that the three-year period of 
the statute of limitations for manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 8(0) 
has now run. Had the information charging murder heen filed 
after the three-year period, the statute would bar a conviction 
for manslaughter. (People v. Stevens, 5 Cal.2d 92, 99 [53 P.2d 
133] ; People v. Miller, 12 Cal. 291, 294-295; People v. Angelo, 
24Cal.App.2d 626, 628 [75 P.2d 614]; People v. Meyers, 39 
Cal.App. 244, 245 [178 P. 965].) Since the ·information was 
filed before the three-year period had run, however, a man-
slaughter conviction is not barred. (People v. Brooks, 50 
Qa1.App.2d .610,611 [123 P.2d 556].) Petitioner may be tried 
under the original information or she may move to have the 
information amended to reflect the fact that she can now be 
convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter. In any 
event, the jury will be instructed that manslf!.ughter is the 
greatest offense for which she can be convicted. (People v. 
McFarlane, supra, 138 Cal. 481, 485.) , 
The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and 
White, J.,. concurred. 
-Retired A880ciate Justice of the Supreme Court Bitting under asslgu-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
